Esra Nur Turan-Küçük

Research

How does a mind acquire a concept it did not begin with? My answer is that a concept’s structure need not be innate or learned. It can be inherited from a representational system that was never about that concept.

I work in two domains that show this from opposite sides. For possibility, children have the form without the content: the system that tracks objects supplies the structure a disjunction requires while representing nothing modal. For life, they have the content without the form: expectations about insides and growth do inductive work years before the category is one a child will state. In both cases, what develops is not the structure but its availability to explicit thought.

I test these claims with behavioral and computational studies with 2- to 7-year-olds, infant looking-time methods, online testing, and Bayesian meta-analysis.

Children’s concepts of possibility

What can young children represent as merely possible?

In a classic task, children must place a hand under each exit of a tube to be sure of catching a ball. Four-year-olds do this reliably and 3-year-olds typically do not, which has been read as evidence that younger children cannot hold mutually exclusive possibilities in mind.

I asked whether this reflects a missing modal concept or the demands of representing possibilities about location. In a new paradigm the uncertainty is about identity: two animals take turns going down a slide, and children get a snack ready for whichever comes out. Three-year-olds prepared for both possibilities as well as 4-year-olds did, and across ages 2 to 4 children were more accurate under identity uncertainty than location uncertainty (Journal of Experimental Child Psychology, 2025; Open Mind, 2026).

My dissertation traces this asymmetry to the object representational system. Object indexes represent an object’s location necessarily but bind identifying features only optionally, so an index can hold several possible identities open for one object but cannot place one object in two locations. A child can meet the logical demands of a disjunction without having a concept of the merely possible.

identity vs. locationobject representation

Does the timing of uncertainty matter?

A ball that has not yet dropped leaves the world open, while a ball that has landed leaves only the child’s knowledge incomplete. Competing accounts predict opposite developmental orders. In matched future and present tasks, 3- and 4-year-olds performed strikingly similarly (Developmental Psychology, 2026), and a Bayesian meta-analysis of the wider literature is under review. What a representation can hold open should not depend on whether the world is undecided or only the child is.

future vs. presentmeta-analysis

What limits performance in possibility tasks?

Preparing for two outcomes requires representing the outcomes and also the actions that would cover them. When 3-year-olds were first shown the set of possible actions, they recognized and adopted the optimal strategy as well as 4-year-olds (Cognition, 2024). Work with Fatima Tuba Yaylacı asks how active participation changes children’s reasoning, including in Turkish children (under review).

With Stephanie Alderete, Fei Xu, and Dr. Melissa M. Kibbe, I compared the five tasks that dominate this literature on five ancillary demands, and argue that the minimal competence often attributed to 3-year-olds is a resource signature rather than a conceptual stage (Developmental Psychology, 2026). What has been read as the late arrival of a concept is better described as the cost of putting an existing format to work.

planningtask demands

How do children search for possibilities they must generate?

Every task above hands children the alternatives to consider. In ongoing work with Dr. Elizabeth Bonawitz at Harvard, 3- to 6-year-olds choose which windows to look through to learn about a hidden shape and draw what might be behind one. This asks what children do when possibilities have to be generated rather than supplied, and links possibility reasoning to how children decide what evidence is worth gathering.

hypothesis generationexploration

Children’s concepts of what is alive

Plants are unambiguously living, yet they lack nearly every cue by which infants and children pick out living things: they do not move on their own and do not seem to act toward goals. That makes them the case where a commitment that outruns experience is easiest to detect.

Do infants represent plants as a distinct kind?

With Dr. Melissa M. Kibbe, I adapted an object individuation paradigm to ask whether prelinguistic infants treat plants as a kind apart from agents and inanimate objects, and I am running follow-up studies with older infants. Either answer tells me where in development the commitment begins. A registered report is in preparation.

infancyindividuation

Do children expect plants to have animal-like insides?

School-age children judge whether animals, plants, and non-living natural objects are alive, and use an imaginary X-ray machine to predict what each has inside. The question is whether children’s expectations about plants run ahead of what they are willing to call alive.

inductioncategorization

Does being alive confer moral standing?

With Dr. Deborah Kelemen at Boston University, I ask whether 4- to 7-year-olds extend moral concern along the same boundary, and whether plants occupy a position between people and rocks. If moral standing follows the inductive profile rather than the explicit label, the content of the concept lives in inferences the child is already making, and the word arrives late. Manuscript under review.

moral reasoningbiology

Where this is going

Papers: Publications →